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FERNANDO RIOSMENA*– MARIA WINKLER-DWORAK**
ALEXIA PRSKAWETZ*** – GUSTAV FEICHTINGER***
The impact of policies influencing the demography 
of age-structured populations: lessons from academies 
of sciences
1.   INTRODUCTION
Population aging is transforming the demographic makeup of many
nations (e.g. Bongaarts, 2009; Uhlenberg, 2009). While longstanding pat-
terns of low fertility have been major contributors to the observed trends,
significant reductions in adult mortality - including the oldest-old ages - have
had and will continue to have a nontrivial impact on the age structure (Pre-
ston et al., 1989; Rowland, 1996; Kim and Schoen, 1997). Under prevailing
systems of social security, labour market policies and institutional frame-
works these demographic developments may pose economic challenges and
could endanger the sustainability of economic growth in most industrialised
countries (see works in Prskawetz et al., 2008).
Various kinds of age-structured organisations (e.g., universities, armies,
airlines) face similar challenges as they age more rapidly than general popu-
lations. An interesting case study is that of academies of sciences because
academicians have historically exhibited, and still exhibit, remarkable
longevity (e.g., Andreev and Jdanov, 2007; Winkler-Dworak, 2008), con-
tributing to aging from the top. Furthermore, academies have been aging
from the bottom as many have increasingly elected older members over the
years (detailed in Section 2 below; see also Van den Kaa and Roo 2003; Leri-
don, 2004; Cohen, 2009). For these reasons, some academies have expressed
a certain degree of interest in regulating their pace of aging (Van de Kaa and
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Roo, 2003; Feichtinger et al., 2007) and growth (Cohen, 2009)1.  
To be sure, academies of sciences, along with most other organisations,
have features that make their population dynamics somewhat different to those
of general (or geographically-defined) entities such as those of nation-states. For
instance, unlike general populations, where the current generation of individuals
will spawn the following one (and so on), current academicians will not, in a
strict sense, spawn the next generations of academy members (they will indeed
elect them, but that is conceptually different, at least from the point of view of
population dynamics). Yet, as we discuss in more detail below, some features of
the models used to study the steady-state aging and growth implications of age-
structured intake in academies of sciences are very similar to various models
used to study the consequences of (age-structured) immigration on the size and
age composition of nation-states (e.g., Espenshade, Bouvier, and Arthur, 1982;
Feichtinger and Steinmann, 1992; Alho, 2008). As such, as we also posit below,
the study of academies of sciences is not only an application of these models but
can potentially inform them.
Furthermore, even though academies face particular challenges and con-
straints not faced by nation-states if these were to regulate their pace of aging
through immigration, they can also exert more control with regards to the num-
ber and age distributions of elections than most governments. As such, we argue
it is particularly fitting to evaluate the implications of different intake policies in
learned societies. 
Prior research on the aging and growth implications of academies has, by
and large, focused on one academy (e.g., Van de Kaa and Roo, 2003; Leridon,
2004; Feichtinger et al., 2007; Cohen, 2009) and, as such, a particular type of
intake policy (explained in more detail below). In this paper, we assess the role
of a more diverse set of policies aimed at regulating the size and age structure of
intake in influencing the potential evolution of full membership of a broader set
of academies of sciences: the Austrian, Berlin-Brandenburg, Russian and Nor-
wegian Academies and the Royal Society of London. We first provide some
background to the problem by summarising the types of intake policies and prac-
tices carried out by many academies, discussing their potential implications for
the size and age structure of these societies, and relating their study to that of age-
structured intake in general populations. Next, we briefly describe the data and
history of each of the academies we hereby study, showing the degree of varia-
tion in policies across them, and introduce the methodology used to evaluate
these policies. Finally, we illustrate the effect of different policies on aging by
contrasting the steady-state and transient dynamics of different projections of
1 The pace of aging even prompted the Académie des Sciences to undertake a major reform in
2002. The latter involves (1) introducing an age threshold, where members surpassing this age do
not count for the maximum number of members  and a new member may be elected in their place,
and (2) by stipulating that half of the new entrants had to be under 55 (Leridon, 2004, p. 102).
The first of the aforementioned policies is also followed by the Austrian Academy of Sciences,
the Berlin Brandenburg Academy of Sciences as well as the Norwegian Academy of Sciences.
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full members (hereafter FM) in each academy into 2070 and measuring the
size and age-compositional effect of enacting a given policy vis-à-vis a stan-
dard policy scenario. We conclude by discussing the implications of our find-
ings for academies, other organizations, and for the study of the effects of age-
structured intake on population dynamics.
2. ACADEMY POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT OF STABLE POPULATION
MODELS OPEN TO AGE-STRUCTURED INTAKE
2.1   Background
Academies of science have aged considerably in the last few years (Van de
Kaa and de Roo, 2006; Cohen, 2009). To illustrate, Figure 1 shows trends in the
mean age of the population in the five European academies of sciences in our
study (introduced and described in more detail in Section 3). Four of these acad-
emies currently have mean ages above 68, a result of a rapid, secular trend due
to both aging from the top and bottom.2 Academicians’ longevity, already
2 Although the mean age of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences is somewhat lower, this
may be an artifact of the election of very young members after the academy was re-founded in
the wake of German reunification (see Section 3.1 below for more details). As such, it may be
more of a transitional stage than a radically different regime relative to other academies.
Figure 1 – Mean age of full members by academy and period 
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remarkable throughout history (Houdaille, 1980; Leridon, 2004; Matthiesen,
1998; Andreev and Jdanov, 2007; Van de Kaa and de Roo, 2008; Winkler-
Dworak, 2008; Cohen, 2009; Andreev et al., 2011; Winkler-Dworak, 2012), has
continued to increase over the past few decades at a more rapid rate than life
expectancy improvements in the general population (Andreev and Jdanov, 2007;
Van de Kaa and de Roo, 2008; Winkler-Dworak, 2008; Andreev et al., 2011). 
In most academies, aging due to high and increasing life expectancy has
been compounded by an upward trend in the mean age at election (see Figure 2).
On the one hand, academy practices in Austria have remained more stable, elect-
ing relatively older members since the early to mid-20th century (older than the
average in all academies but the Russian). On the other hand, the mean age at
election in the Royal Society of London and the Russian and Norwegian acade-
mies increased a non-trivial 4 years from 1950-1974 and 1993-2005 (see Section
3 for an explanation of the lower age at election in Berlin-Brandenburg in 1993-
2005). Note that the Berlin-Brandenburg academy, as we explain in more detail
in Section 3, is a special case given its more recent foundation
Compared to nation states, the age structure of these (and other) organisa-
tions is especially sensitive to changes in survival and intake. This is because an
academy’s entire intake is itself age-structured (as opposed to populations that
also grow of course through sizable birth flows), which tends to yield milder
Figure 2 – Mean age of full members by academy and year
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rejuvenation effects (Schmertman, 1992). The prospects of large growth pose a
challenge for most academies, which wish to remain selective bodies, and which
also have financial constraints to elect many new members (particularly those
that may provide research funds or a stipend to their members). 
At the same time, these organisations can certainly regulate the number of
newly-elected members in a more effective way than, say, a (democratic)
nation-state, which is generally able to set strict limits on immigration (e.g.,
due to family reunification provisions), or influence fertility changes. As such,
academies are better equipped to regulate their pace of aging through several
policies affecting the number and, with a bit more difficulty, the age structure
of newly-elected members. Moreover, the potential of age-structured inflow
(i.e., net immigration) as a solution to population aging in nation states appears
somewhat limited (Schmertmann, 1992; Espenshade, 2001; United Nations,
2001; Coleman, 2002).
Academies can have an impact on aging by regulating their pace of
growth (to some extent given the reasons summarized above). The byelaws
(or otherwise, common practices) of most academies regulate growth either
by setting the number of elections per year to a (relatively) fixed number.
Alternatively, it has been the policy of some academies to fix the number of
members below a certain age and if a member surpasses this age, a new mem-
ber may be elected in his place. Hence, the number of vacancies and, thus, the
number of elections is linked to the number of academy members reaching
this age (ignoring the almost negligible low mortality of the academicians
below this age). As explained next, under certain conditions, either fixed or
linked intake will lead to a stationary steady-state. This is a useful feature to
evaluate and compare different intake policies in academies. Furthermore, it
implies that these two intake regimes are part of a family of stable population
models open to age-structured intake.
2.2   Previous research on stable population models open to age-structured intake
Scholars have studied the implications of age-structured intake on popula-
tion size (and age structure) by looking at steady state (generally stationary) con-
ditions. After Pollard (1973) and Espenshade, Bouvier, and Arthur (1982)3
showed that populations with below-replacement fertility and fixed mortality
schedules reached a stationary equilibrium (a few generations) after adding a
3 Pollard (1973) and Espenshade et al. (1982) showed similar results for the discrete and contin-
uous case respectively. For further details and discussion this and other (less used) stable popu-
lation models open to migration, see Preston and Coale (1982), Mitra (1983), Cerone and Mitra
(1986), Cerone (1987), Feichtinger and Steinmann (1992), Schmertmann (1992), Wu and Li
(2003), and Alho (2008).
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fixed (age-specific) immigrant flow, this general idea has been used more recent-
ly to understand the impacts of immigration on population ageing and growth
(e.g., Arthur and Espenshade, 1988; Schmertmann, 1992; United Nations,
2002; Riosmena et al., 2012). Following a similar logic (and as we illustrate
empirically in Section 4), a fixed mortality schedule with a fixed number of
new members by age will imply stationary conditions for academies in the
future. Given that intake (and to a lesser extent, mortality) have been some-
what more stable than the demographic regimes of most nation-state popula-
tions, we use this property to evaluate the implications of fixed intake on the
growth and ageing of academies. 
As shown by Feichtinger and colleagues (Feichtinger et al., 2007; Dawid
et al., 2009), linked intake policies also lead to a stationary steady state under
a fixed mortality schedule and a constant age structure of intake. This is
because the flow of newly elected members eventually becomes fixed after a
period of pre-transitional dynamics, thus yielding the conditions needed for a
stationary steady state.4 As such, one can also study the effects of linked
intake policies on the growth and aging of academies using a similar approach
to that used when evaluating fixed intake policies. It follows, of course, that
both policies can then be compared in terms, for instance, of the pre-transi-
tional growth they generate. 
Furthermore, note that the fact that both fixed and linked intake regimes
become stationary implies they will lead to the exact same age structure as
long as the age composition of new members is the same. Under conditions
leading to a stationary steady state (regardless if the regime is fixed or linked),
high and low growth regimes with the same mortality schedule and the same
age composition of elections will lead to the exact same stationary structure.
However, these two regimes will differ in their pre-equilibrium aging and
growth dynamics and in their stationary size, but not in terms of age structure
(see Section 4 below). 
For this reason, the age structure of elections may be an even more
important policy variable to regulate than the age structure of the organisa-
tion. The age structure of intake has been shown to be a very important fac-
tor influencing the size and age structure of both nation-states (Arthur and
4 For a similar logic on the study of the effects of immigration on the size and age structure of
nation-states, see Alho (2008) and Riosmena et al. (2012). Alho (2008) used a result derived by
Pollard (1973) to show that a population will reach stability by linking the number of immigrants
to (a fraction of) the birth flow under a fixed fertility and mortality schedule (note, however, that
the steady state may not be stationary, depending on fertility levels, see  Mitra, 1983). The case of
linked intake of academies of science (under fixed mortality conditions) is not much different than
if intake is linked in a similar way as in the case of these studies (but to another age structure
parameter).
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Espenshade, 1988; Schmertmann, 1992) and academies of science (Feichtinger
et al., 2007). As such, we study the pre-transitional dynamics and steady-state
size and age structure under different age structures of intake. 
The age structure of the academy can vary for several reasons. Some are
exogenous, such as the age composition of the potential pool of potential aca-
demicians, affected by supply-side factors beyond the scope of this paper
(e.g., substantial differences in the quality of different cohorts of scientists).
Assuming that these exogenous factors are negligible or, less strictly speak-
ing, that there is no shortage of qualified candidates to become academy
members within a reasonable age range (e.g., between 40 and 70 years of
age), demand-side factors, somewhat controlled by academies through differ-
ent kinds of policies and practices, then become the main factor determining
the age structure of elections.
Academies control the age structure of elections by their desire, for
instance, “[…] to stay in touch with the community of working researchers if
it is to continue to play a useful role as an advisory body in society.” (Leri-
don, 2004, p. 83), as older academies may be seen as “not dynamic enough
and no longer well-informed.” (Van de Kaa and Roo, 2006, p. 20). Acade-
mies, particularly those under linked intake, may also control the age struc-
ture of elections for the explicit purpose of regulating the balance between
aging and growth, or (put differently) aging and open vacancies in linked
intake academies as the following illustration by academician Gerhart Bruck-
mann (cited in Feichtinger et al., 2007) clearly demonstrates for the case of
the Austrian Academy of Sciences:
“With an average age at election of 55 years and ruling out mortality, a member
has 15 remaining years until the age threshold. At a maximum number of 90 mem-
bers, you are bound to see 6 vacancies per year on average. However, if entry at ear-
lier ages were favoured (in order to establish a ‘younger Academy’), e.g., at 47.5
years, then these new members would stay in the system for 22.5 years until the statu-
tory retirement age - exulting in 90/22.5 = 4 vacancies per year.”
Although, in theory, academies should then be able to choose the age struc-
ture of elections they find more appropriate in order to regulate growth and aging
(along with any other purposes the academy may have), it is important to men-
tion that some academies do face self-imposed structural constraints to the age
structure of new members they may be more likely to elect. While not formally
stated in their bylaws, the Austrian and Russian academies elect the vast major-
ity of new ‘full’ members (i.e. those with voting rights and full access to any
other benefits held by academicians) from a pool of another membership cate-
gory, generally known as ‘corresponding’ membership, which thus de facto
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serves as full-membership candidacy. 5
As suggested in Figure 2, the age structure of elections may be higher in
the Austrian and Russian academies due to the existence of a corresponding
membership status in both. This is so as a candidacy period may delay elec-
tion into full membership (for a formal model depicting these dynamics, see
Feichtinger et al., 2011). To illustrate this, Table 1 shows estimates of lifetime
probabilities of being promoted from CM to FM in Austria for those elected
as CM between 1960 and 1990. The probability of becoming a FM was lower
the older academicians were when elected as CM. Transition probabilities
ranged from 88 % for (the few) members elected before their 46th birthday to
38% for those elected as CM after age 55 (probabilities decrease monotoni-
cally for the age groups in-between). Thus, if most members are elected from
the ranks of CM and their ages at election as CM signal the strength of their
records and potential for being elected as FM, then the age structure of FM
intake is a function of and, as such, is constrained by the age structure of CMs
(for a formal exposition, see Feichtinger et al., 2011). 
5 According to our analysis of membership data for the Austrian and Russian Academies (described
in the next Section), full members in the Austrian Academy of Science are elected almost exclu-
sively from the pool of corresponding members (the exceptions being: during the very first years
of the academy; during years when the maximum number of members is increased; and in histor-
ically extraordinary periods, such as during WWII). Although the share of full members who have
been previously corresponding members in the Russian Academy is lower than in the Austrian
Academy, it has been rising over time. In the 19th century as well as in the beginning of the 20th
century, the number of elections were much lower and the share of full members, previously cor-
responding members, was quite erratic (bouncing between 0 and 100%), with a mean of 32% for
1798-1949, 48% for 1800-1849, and 55% for 1900-1949. For the years 1950-1974, the share
ranged between 67% and 91% (mean = 85%). For the most recent period, 1975-2006, at minimum
80% of the academicians at each election have been corresponding members before and at most
98%, where the mean over all 31 years equals 92%.
Table 1 – Probability of ever becoming a full member, mean duration 
before FM election, and mean age at election as FM in the Austrian Academy
of Sciences by age and period of election as corresponding member, 
members elected as CM in 1966-1990.
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Whether or not the existence of a corresponding member status delays
election into full membership, considering different age structures of elec-
tions is very relevant to evaluate the trade-offs between aging and growth,
particularly in academies with linked intake regimes (see Feichtinger et al.,
2007; Dawid et al., 2009). Before introducing our methodology, we next
describe our data and provide a brief profile of each academy under study.
3.     DATA AND METHODS 
3.1   Data and a brief portrait of the academies 
We base our comparisons of different election policies on data from histor-
ical membership records (up to 2005, the last year of availability for most acad-
emies) of five European learned societies: the Austrian Academy of Sciences,
the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, the Royal Society in London,
the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Norwegian Academy of Sciences and
Letters. We use first-hand data provided by the respective academy and mem-
bership registers published either online (The Royal Society, 2005; Russian
Academy of Sciences, 2008; Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wis-
senschaften, 2009) or in hard copy (Amundsen, 1957; Hittmair and Hunger,
1997; Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996-2005; Russian
Academy of Sciences, 1999; Helsvig, 2007) as well as from Andreev and
Jdanov (2007). The size and age structure of full membership varies consider-
ably across academies (see Table 2, Figure 1) and can be explained by variation
in intake rates, the age structure of new members (Figure 2), and - only to a
minor extent - by the mortality conditions to which members are exposed
(Andreev et al., 2011; Winkler-Dworak, 2012).
The Austrian Academy of Sciences (OEAW), founded in 1847, limits the
number of members below a statutory ‘retirement’ (henceforth SR) age of 70
years (since 1972-1975 years in 1950-1971) to 45 in each of its two Sections:
Mathematics and the Natural Sciences, and Humanities and the Social Sci-
ences (Feichtinger et al., 2007). Despite the total number of FMs below that
age thus being limited to 90, the actual size of the academy as of mid-May
2005 (just after elections took place) was 164, as 45 per cent of FMs were
over age 70. New members are required to have Austrian residence and stellar
academic records. They also generally come from the ranks of Corresponding
Members (henceforth, CMs). 
The Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences (BBAW) was founded,
strictly speaking, only in 1993, though many of its members had previously
belonged to the roster of the old Prussian Academy, which became the German
Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 1946 and was renamed Academy of Sciences
of the German Democratic Republic in 1972 (Berlin-Brandenburgische
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Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009). In the wake of German reunification, the
academy was closed in 1992 and re-constituted in 1993 with the new name.
Upon ‘re-foundation’, the Academy dropped the CM status, enacted a retirement
age of 68 and established a limit of 200 members below the statutory retirement
(SR) age. However, as of early 2005, membership under the SR age was still
well below the limit, namely at 169. The whole full membership of the BBAW
sums up to 173 (Table 2), making those above the SR age only 2.3 per cent of
total membership.
The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) lacks a statutory retirement age
and does not have any clear limits for the number of elections, which take place
every three years (unlike the other academies where elections occur annually).
As of mid-2005, there were 496 FMs, by and large elected from a pool of corre-
sponding members. Despite having one of the highest growth rates (Figure 3)
and lowest life expectancies among academies (Andreev et al., 2011; Winkler-
Dworak, 2012), the Russian academy has the oldest observed age structure: 68%
of their members are above age 70. This is due to the fact that newly elected
members tend to be much older than those in other academies: the mean age at
election in the 15 years prior to 2005 was around 61, roughly 4 years older than
in any of the other four academies (Figure 2).
Like in the Russian case, the Royal Society (RS) lacks a statutory retirement
age or any membership size limits per se (in addition, it lacks a corresponding
member category). Although the RS does limit the number of elected fellows (to
44 per annum), this intake is large enough (relative to the total membership) to
Table 2 – Summary of history, policies, and membership and age structure (as
of January 2005) of academies
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result in high growth in the latter half of the 20th century (Figure 3), making the
RS the largest academy of the five societies hereby studied, with membership
standing at 1,257 in mid-2005 (Table 2). Such high growth has indeed resulted
in a younger age structure as compared to that of the Austrian and Russian acad-
emies, but not compared to the still young group of academicians from Berlin-
Brandenburg (Figure 1). 
The Norwegian Academy of Sciences and Letters, with a similar mean age
as the Royal Society (Figure 1) does not have a corresponding member status
either but does have a statutory retirement age of 67 (in line with Norwegian law
for any member of the labour force). As in the Austrian and Berlin-Brandenburg
cases, membership size below the SR age is limited (in this case to 219 mem-
bers). However, the total size of the academy is 459, implying that 52% of its
members are older than the SR age, a percentage similar to the one observed in
the Austrian academy.
3.2   Methods
In order to understand the effect of different policies and practices regard-
ing intake type and the age structure of elections on the academies’ size and age
structure, we project the population of each academy to 2070 using cohort-com-
Figure 3 – Full membership size by academy and year
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ponent projections (e.g., Preston et al., 2001, Chapter 6). While this allows us
to study the steady-state age structure in each regime, we also compare the
ultimate size of different scenarios for each academy in order to understand
how pre-transitional dynamics (e.g. momentum) vary by scenario and accord-
ing to initial conditions in each academy. 
The cohort-component method is a discrete-time model of population
dynamics, where the number of persons by age and sex are projected forward
stepwise, based on the assumptions on fertility, mortality, and migration: first,
the number of persons surviving to the beginning of the next time interval
according to the postulated age and sex-specific death rates is computed. Sec-
ondly, the number of births, implied by the assumed age-specific fertility rates,
is derived, and then, the number of those births surviving to the beginning of the
next time interval is computed. Next, the number of emigrants is subtracted from
the population, and then the number of births to immigrants is computed. Final-
ly, the number of immigrants and their births surviving to the beginning of the
next time interval are added to the population. In the case of academy members,
the method simplifies because 1) membership is lifelong, and thus there is no
emigration apart from voluntary exits, which are negligible, and 2) members are
appointed only by election (comparable to immigration) rather than by birth.
Hence, only the members surviving to the next time interval and the number of
newly elected members for each age group need to be calculated.
To avoid conflating the effects of policies (or initial conditions) and
those of differential mortality across academies (Andreev et al., 2011; Win-
kler-Dworak, 2012), we standardise longevity conditions by using a mortali-
ty Scenario for all academies used previously by Feichtinger et al. (2007, p.
23). This standard Scenario assumes the same mortality development as in the
latest forecast of death probabilities by Statistics Austria (Hanika and Klotz,
2005), which were derived using the Lee-Carter method (Lee and Carter,
1992). As academicians show a significantly lower mortality than the gener-
al population, the forecasted death rates were adjusted according to the stan-
dardised mortality ratio for the most recent period (for more details see
Feichtinger et al., 2007). This Scenario produces mortality estimates until
2050, after which we fixed mortality conditions (at 2050 levels) until 2070.
We manipulate two main policies in our Scenarios: intake type (linked
vs. fixed) and the age distribution of elections (status quo vs. standard). We
present results from three scenarios for each academy (except the Austrian, as
is explained below). First, the status quo scenario assumes academies to have
followed the same intake type they currently practice with an age structure of
elections based upon a smoothed version of the academy-specific age distri-
bution of election in the 1990-2004 period (the number of elections is based
on recent numbers for fixed-intake academies as well). Figure 4 shows the
smoothed status quo age distribution of election in each. 
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The second Scenario uses the same status quo age structure of elections but
the opposite intake policy to the one currently observed (i.e. from fixed to linked
intake or vice versa). The third Scenario uses the status-quo intake policy while
standardising the age structure of elections. We use the Austrian Academy of
Sciences’ age distribution as our standard given that it is close to an average for
these academies (except it has slightly lower variance than all but the Berlin-
Brandenburg) and as it has been found to be a good approximation to an optimal
election policy (under linked intake) that maximizes the number of elections
while minimizes its aging effects (Feichtinger et al., 2007). As the standard cho-
sen is that of the Austrian academy, we do not present the latter Scenario for this
academy as it is of course exactly the same as the status quo projection.
Note that some of these policy Scenarios required additional assumptions.
First, although the Russian Academy of Sciences has no clear limits on the num-
ber of elections in recent years, we specified the number of elections in its sta-
tus quo scenario to 42 elections per year (the average on the 15 years prior to our
baseline) to facilitate comparisons with other academies and policies. Second,
when going from fixed to linked intake, we chose a SR age of 70 and fixed the
size below this age to 750 in the case of the Royal Society and 300 in the case
of the Russian Academy of Sciences.6 The number of vacancies (elections) under
Figure 4 – Full membership size by academy and age
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the new linked regime is not fixed but corresponds to the number of members
that turned 70 that year plus the number of deaths occurring before age 70 (an
only minor figure due to the low mortality of academicians). Moreover, when
changing the intake policy from fixed to linked elections, we also had to truncate
and rescale the status quo distribution of age at elections so no FM elections take
place after 70 in the status quo calculations. Finally, going from linked to fixed
intake requires specifying the annual number of elections: we set the number of
elections for these academies (Austrian, Norwegian and BBAW) to the average
number of elections in the 15 years prior to our initial year (i.e. in the 1990-2004
period). That value was equal to 7 in the Austrian Academy of Sciences, 15 in
the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and 17 in the Norwegian Acade-
my of Sciences and Letters.
4. COMPARING ACADEMIES’ TRANSIENT AND ULTIMATE SIZE AND
AGE STRUCTURE UNDER DIFFERENT POLICIES 
4.1   Effect of intake policy
Table 3 shows results for each Scenario in terms of (A) academy size, (B)
number of elections per year, (C) mean age of academy members, (D) the stan-
dard deviation in the mean age of the members of the academy and (E) the pro-
portion of members below age 70. We present these figures at initial, medium-
run and steady-state conditions as reflected by the values of these quantities in
2006, 2025 and 2070. Regarding size (Panel A), going from linked to fixed
intake (that corresponds to levels equal to the average number of elections per
period in 1990-2004) in the Austrian, Norwegian and Berlin-Brandenburg cases
implies growing stronger in the pre-transitional period (ultimate size is 6.6%
higher in the first two academies and 14% higher in the latter) than in the status
quo scenario. The number of elections (which are equal to the number of open
vacancies below the SR age, see Panel B) are higher in the short run in the sta-
tus-quo than in the fixed-intake Scenarios but then stabilise to a similar or slight-
ly lower level than the average number of elections in 1990-2004 used in the
fixed-intake Scenario. Note that the short-run growth is exceptionally high in the
Berlin-Brandenburg academy as they had not met its stipulated limit of 200
members below age 68 by 2005. 
6 In the case of the Royal Society, this number is close to the number of members below age 70
at baseline thereby tying its future growth to its pace of aging. In the case of the Russian Acade-
my of Sciences, we allowed it to grow from its baseline membership below age 70 of ~200 to
300 as fixing it at 200 would have implied a very sizable dip in the number of academicians of
all ages in the steady state given that the academy age structure is considerably older than that of
the other academies (and as such, the implied number of elections in the linked-intake scenario
would have plummeted relative to the status-quo scenario). Note, however, that even setting this
number to 300 implied a moderate amount of negative momentum for the Russian Academy. We
discuss this below.
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Table 3 – Membership size, intake, and age structure of full membership
according to different Scenarios by academy
...Cont’d...
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Transitioning from a fixed  to a linked-intake type of election (Scenario 2
in Table 3) implies a lower average number of elections in the projection peri-
od and thus a smaller membership size for the Russian Academy of Sciences:
its steady-state size under fixed intake would be 1,191 members while under
linked intake the stationary size would be only 829. While one would expect
that a relatively old age structure of intake, such as the status-quo distribution
of elections in the Russian Academy of Sciences, implied a large number of
elections given the trade-off between number of elections and age structure of
members at election under linked intake (Dawid et al., 2009), the large differ-
ence in ultimate size between these two scenarios is the result of negative
momentum (Rowland, 1996). That means, as the percentage of Russian acad-
emicians who are above age 70 is rather large (63 per cent, see Panel E), the
Table 3 – Cont’d
THE IMPACT OF POLICIES INFLUENCING THE DEMOGRAPHY OF AGE-STRUCTURED...
45
projected number of deaths is well above the projected number of newly-elect-
ed members. Note that this is true even though, in the linked-intake Scenario, we
set the number of academicians below the SR age to 300, a number well above
the number of members below age 70 at baseline (158). As such, our estimate of
negative momentum is quite conservative relative to that of enacting a policy set-
ting the number of members below the SR age close to the status quo at baseline
(as we do in the case of the Royal Society). Only if we increased the maximum
size of the academy under age 70 to almost triple the number of members below
70 in 2006 (results not shown) would these differences vanish.
In contrast, the Royal Society would grow slightly less rapidly under its cur-
rent policy of fixed intake, projected to be 1,571 by 2070 than by linking the
number of elections to those reaching age 70, projected to 1,596. This is due to
the fact that the recent past of a large number of elections under a young age
structure of intake resulted in a favourable age structure of members in 2006
allowing a considerable amount of growth in the short run as these relatively
large cohorts come close to ‘retirement’ age. Coincidentally, the ultimate num-
ber of elections under the linked intake is the same as the fixed-intake number of
elections.
Remarkably, changing intake policies while keeping the age structure of
elections constant has no consequences regarding the aging prospects of acade-
mies in the long run: regardless of initial conditions, academy size and intake
type, the same age-specific distribution of intake and mortality schedules results
in the same age structure for all (i.e. one with a mean age of 74.2 years and a
standard deviation of 11.6 years around the mean, where 58.35% of members are
above age 70; see Panels C, D, and E for Scenario 3 in all academies, Table 3).
Hence, choosing between a policy that fixes or anchors the number of elections
with the same age distribution will affect the stationary size but not the station-
ary age structure of an academy. As we base our parameter assumptions on the
recent past history of the academies in terms of number of elections and age
structure of members, the growth rates under fixed or linked type do not differ
substantially. As long as the latter holds, the stationary age structure is independ-
ent of the type of intake because of ergodicity (Lopez, 1967). Nevertheless, the
number of elections could vary considerably during the pre-transitional period
due to momentum (Keyfitz, 1971). 
4.2   Effect of age structure at election
Scenario 3 in Table 3 presents the results for each academy with the status-
quo type of election but standardising for the age structure at election. Obvious-
ly, an older (younger) age structure of intake implies that the steady-state age
structure of the academy will be older (younger). That means that using the stan-
dard age distribution at election implies a younger ultimate age structure of
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members for the Russian Academy of Sciences and an older age structure of
members for the other learned societies (see Panels C, D and E in Table 3, Sce-
nario 3). Again, the ultimate age structure is solely determined by the age distri-
bution at election, regardless of initial conditions or intake type. Standardising
for the age distribution at election, the age structure of members for all acade-
mies eventually converges to the same age structure, which is characterised by a
mean age of full members of 74.2 years, a standard deviation of 11.6 years
around the mean and a proportion of members below age 70 equal to 58.4 per
cent. 
Note that a lower dispersion of the age at election in the standard sce-
nario compared to the status quo implies also a lower ultimate dispersion of
age of members except for the Russian Academy of Sciences (see Panel D in
Table 3). While the standard deviation of the status-quo age distribution of the
Russian Academy is about two years larger than the standard deviation of the
standard age distribution, the steady-state standard deviation of the status quo
is actually slightly lower than the one of the standard age distribution for the
Russian Academy of Sciences. The latter results can be explained by the high-
er ages of members in the status-quo scenario for the Russian Academy of
Sciences and the fact that mortality increases with age, implying a more left-
skewed age structure of members compared to the standard Scenario. 
The implications of standardising the age structure at election on the size
and number of elections do indeed hinge on the type of intake. Under fixed
intake, the pre-transitional growth implications of standardising the age struc-
ture of elections (as reflected in the steady-state size of the academy) are con-
tingent on whether the status quo distribution is older/younger than the stan-
dard of course: ceteris paribus, a younger distribution of elections will yield
a larger steady-state academy than an older age distribution (see also Arthur
and Espenshade, 1988). For the Russian Academy, where the status quo age
structure of intake is older than the standard, electing 42 younger members
per year with the younger standard age structure would result in a larger sta-
tionary size (1,383; see Scenario 3, Table 3) than electing 42 academicians
with the older status quo age structure (1,191; see Scenario 1, Table 3). In the
Royal Society, going from electing 44 members with a younger status quo age
distribution to electing the same number of members with the older standard
intake schedule (the opposite direction of the change in Russian academy)
would imply attaining a slightly smaller academy in the steady state (1,571
vs. 1,449; Scenarios 3 and 1, respectively, Table 3). In both cases, this is a
result of a higher pre-stationary transitional growth under a younger age
structure as a result of lower crude death rates.
As mentioned before, the effect of a younger or older age structure of
elections on the stationary size of academies with linked-intake regimes is not
as straightforward as in fixed-intake academies where deaths are the only
component of growth depending on how young or old the age structure of
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elections is. Under linked intake, pre-transitional dynamics of the academy
are more complex as the transient and steady-state number of elections is also
contingent on the age structure of intake. Moreover, unlike the number of deaths,
which are directly proportional to the mean age at election, the number of vacan-
cies is inversely proportional to the mean age at election (Feichtinger et al.,
2007; Dawid et al, 2009). The reason for this is that a younger age structure of
intake will extend the expected waiting time before statutory retirement, thus
implying a lower number of vacancies in the medium and long run (Feichtinger
et al., 2007). On the other hand, a younger age structure of elections will imply
a lower death flow in the medium run. 
Which of these two effects dominates (and thus, if a linked-intake policy
implies a larger or a smaller stationary size than one of fixed intake) depends on
initial conditions, as these will determine the transient election and death flow.
In both linked-intake academies in which we modify the age structure of elec-
tions, the effect of the age structure of elections on the number of open vacan-
cies in the future is stronger than its effects on the death flow. In the Norwegian
Academy, the older standard schedule yields a larger number of elections (20 vs.
16) and a larger population size (665 vs. 568) than the status quo Scenario. Like-
wise, in the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, the older standard age
structure of intake yields both a larger stationary number of elections (17 vs. 13)
and a larger academy size (559 vs. 476) than in the status quo Scenario.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown the importance of different intake policies
on the intrinsic stationary size and age structure of academies of science using
data from five academies with a mix of heterogeneous policies/practices. First
and foremost, we have shown that the stationary age structure is solely deter-
mined by the age structure at election, independent of the type of intake. Most
obviously, a younger age structure of inflow implies a younger stationary age
structure in academies with either type of intake (for a mathematical exposi-
tion applied to the population of nation-states, and applicable for the most part
to fixed-intake academies, see Schmertmann, 1992). 
However, secondly, we have also found that both intake type and the age
structure of intake do have an effect on the stationary size of an academy.
Linked intake generally yields a smaller academy size than fixing the number
of elections to the average number in recent times. Furthermore, in fixed-
intake academies, a younger age structure led to a larger academy size where-
as it did not necessarily lead to higher growth in linked-intake academies. As
such, provided an academy is interested in curbing growth (or to maintain
fixed its membership of scientists below a certain age, for whatever other pur-
pose), a linked intake policy may be a more sensible approach to regulate
such growth. Note that this decision would come “cost-free” in terms of any
aging trade-offs given that, as mentioned before, the stationary age structure
of an academy is solely governed by the age structure (and not the type or
size) of intake.
The choice of one intake policy over the other is then a matter of decid-
ing (1) how large an academy should be in the long run and (2) what would be
an acceptable set of conditions (e.g., number of elections, academy growth) in
the medium run. Whether or not an academy cares about a more vs. a less lim-
ited amount of growth depends, of course, on its objectives and priorities, for
instance in terms of how it views the relationship between aging, growth, and
academy quality. Concerning the latter, the concern that age is negatively relat-
ed to innovative ability and scientific achievement is often raised. The argu-
ments are mostly based on the early age at which eminent researchers did their
pioneering discoveries (e.g., Lehman, 1953). On the other hand, Stroebe
(2010, p. 664) finds that “there is no universal age-related decline in cogni-
tive ability. […]. To the extent that an age-related decline in scientific
achievements exists, it is more likely to be due to changes in motivation or
the availability of resources.” In fact, academies of sciences offer their mem-
bers, who had to retire due to age-related compulsory retirement regulations,
opportunities and facilities for a continued scientific activity. As such, the
concern with aging in academies seems more rooted in the continued support
of innovative research and new disciplines rather than concerns about produc-
tivity per se.
Despite this, many academies do seem to have a certain degree of con-
cern about their pace of aging (Van de Kaa and Roo, 2003; Leridon, 2004;
Feichtinger et al., 2007), and some about their size (Cohen 2009). In the case
of academies that worry about both, a linked intake might be a better solution,
as it yielded lower growth than all of our alternative fixed intake Scenarios.
A younger age structure of intake yielded not only a lower mean age, but also
lower growth in some of our Scenario (i.e., for the Norwegian and Berlin-
Brandenburg academies).
Note, however, that the growth-limiting feature of a young age structure
of elections under linked intake may entail additional complications given
that it dictates the future number of vacancies in an academy. As such, acad-
emies may need to choose an age structure of elections that does not only
rejuvenate the academy, but also maintains a “reasonable” number of elec-
tions. As other studies have formally demonstrated (Dawid et al., 2009) and
illustrated empirically (Feichtinger et al., 2007), the optimal strategy for this
particular trade-off is attained by using a bimodal age structure of elections
that may include a mix of distinguished scholars close to the retirement age
and of younger promising scientists.
Having said that, our projections of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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highlight the relevance of initial conditions in the pre-equilibrium dynamics
of academies adopting a policy of linked intake. Linked intake only seems
like a reasonable strategy if the recent history of the academy has not implied
both high growth and aging by way of electing many older members. Other-
wise, academies should be aware that the transient dynamics and ultimate size
will be especially sensitive to enacting this policy. In the Russian case, inter-
rupting the history of rapid growth (Figure 1) and an older election schedule
(Figure 4) would imply a most dramatic drop in the ultimate stationary pop-
ulation to levels well below the initial size of the population (Table 3, Panel
A) given that most members in the initial population are already above the
assumed SR age (Table 1). In short, academies should thus consider their
recent demographic history before deciding to enact specific policies as the
transient growth and aging dynamics and ultimate size of the academy will
also depend on them.
In addition to drawing useful lessons for academies and other age-struc-
tured organisations, particularly those with strict retirement policies or those
wishing to remain at a relatively fixed size, our study also contributes to the
literature of stable population models open to age-structured intake, and in
particular on how age-structured intake may affect population aging and
growth. For instance, as laid out in Section 2, our fixed intake scenarios are
analogous to a stable population model open to migration commonly used to
study the effect of immigration on aging in nation-states (e.g., Espenshade et
al., 1982; Arthur and Espenshade, 1988; Feichtinger and Steinman, 1992;
Schmertmann, 1992). 
In addition to the fact that our study is a (modified) application of these
models, our use of linked intake Scenarios, which also yield stationary condi-
tions in the long run, could be considered of potential use to study the impli-
cations of age-structured intake on the population of nation-states. Although
the applicability of our study to less structured populations, such as those of
nation-states, is indeed limited by the fact that academies only grow through
age-structured intake (as opposed to fertility) and future intake is not direct-
ly, strictly linked to the current size of a generation (as in general populations,
where the production of new population members is physically born by other
members), an exploration of linked intake type immigration policies could
prove fruitful from the perspective of both formal demography, and immigra-
tion and ageing policies. Only a few studies have considered linking the num-
ber of immigrants to a given population quantity or parameter (e.g. as a pro-
portion of the number of births, see Alho, 2008). As such, future research
should look at the potential effect of linking the number of immigrants to the
size of other age groups (e.g., in order to keep the size of the labour force sta-
ble) and other kinds of age-structured intake on the aging and size of nation
states at large.
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